The Traditional Roots of Difference by Rambachan, Anantanand
Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies
Volume 26 Article 3
2013
The Traditional Roots of Difference
Anantanand Rambachan
St. Olaf College
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs
The Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies is a publication of the Society for Hindu-Christian Studies. The digital version is made available by Digital
Commons @ Butler University. For questions about the Journal or the Society, please contact cbauman@butler.edu. For more information about
Digital Commons @ Butler University, please contact fgaede@butler.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rambachan, Anantanand () "The Traditional Roots of Difference," Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies: Vol. 26, Article 3.
Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.7825/2164-6279.1542
Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies 26 (2013):2-9 
The Traditional Roots of Difference 
 
Anantanand Rambachan 
St.  Olaf  College
IN Being Different: An Indian Challenge to Western 
Univeralism, Rajiv Malhotra, drawing from and 
building on earlier lines of argument offered by, 
among others, Sri Aurobindo and Richard 
Lannoy, attempts to identify crucial differences 
in the worldviews of what he refers to as the 
Judeo-Christian religions and Indian thought.  
These contrasts are presented with the aim of 
contesting the so-called universalism of the 
Judeo-Christian world-view and highlighting 
the value and even superiority of the Indian 
perspective.  He identifies his method with the 
ancient practice of pūrvapakṣa that involves 
grasping the opponent’s view, refuting it and 
demonstrating the truth of one’s position.  
I welcome this effort by Malhotra, 
continuing the work of thinkers on the Indian 
side like Aurobindo and Gandhi, and engaging 
the significance of these issues in our 
contemporary world context.  Western 
colonialism, with its assumptions about 
universality and superiority, had deep and 
lasting impacts on both colonizer and colonized. 
The latter became the object of inquiry, with 
methodologies that adopted uncritically the 
colonizer’s assumptions. The work of 
uncovering and interrogating these 
assumptions is ongoing and necessary and 
Malhotra’s work is a contribution in this effort. 
The colonizer’s reading of the meaning of the 
colonized religious and cultural heritage is 
pervasive and has become, in many respects, 
normative. Peeling away the layers of 
interpretation is arduous and painstaking. 
Malhotra has certainly chipped away at some of 
these layers and even peeled back a few, 
drawing attention, for example, to differences 
in the significance of history, time, and in 
responses to diversity. He rightly cautions us 
that the globalized world is not a “flat world” 
but one in which “the deeper structures that 
support the power and privilege of certain 
groups are stronger than ever” (p.14). Malhotra 
must be commended for pursuing these issues 
in Being Different and for affirming the 
importance of religious differences.  
Any grand work, like that of Malhotra, 
aiming to undertake a comparison of the 
history and culture of two or more civilizations 
risks generalizations. Malhotra is not unaware 
of this problem and confesses a wish to avoid 
sweeping and misleading generalizations 
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(p.105). This laudable intention, however, does 
not exonerate the writer from problematic 
generalizations, especially when the central 
concern of the discussion is the affirmation and 
celebration of difference and uniqueness. There 
are many, especially from the Jewish tradition, 
who would question the construction of the 
category of “Judeo-Christian,” and Christians 
who would dispute his representation of 
Christian doctrine and theology. My focus in 
this review is on Malhotra’s discussion of Hindu 
traditions.  
Although the concern in Being Different is to 
speak for the so-called dharma traditions, that 
is those originating in the Indian sub-continent, 
his focus is significantly on the Sanskrit texts 
and heritage.1 Within this focus, the voices of 
the Hindu traditions are heard most often, and, 
among these voices, the drumbeat (ḍiṇḍima) of 
Advaita Vedānta prevails. Malhotra speaks of 
all dharma traditions as affirming a belief in the 
“innate oneness” of reality (p.102), but this 
generalization overlooks the dualism of 
classical Yoga, the pluralism of Jainism, and the 
philosophical complexities of the Buddhist 
tradition. Malhotra’s clarification of 
consequential differences between the 
traditions of India and Judaism and Christianity 
can be pursued without the homogenization 
into which his discussion too often slips, but 
this will require a greater readiness to engage 
the rich theological diversity of the traditions 
of India and to identify the specific roots of his 
arguments. 
My concern with Malhotra’s treatment of 
the Hindu traditions goes deeper and, since his 
arguments, as I read these, are derived 
principally from the Advaita tradition, I will 
confine my major comments to his 
representation of this sampradāya. In a work 
that devotes itself so appropriately and 
extensively to the nature and sources of 
knowledge, as well as to the grounds for 
comparing truth claims, I found it surprising 
that there was no discussion of the centrality 
and significance of pramāṇa to the Vedānta 
traditions or any effort to situate his discussion 
in relation to classical epistemologies. This 
subject is important if Malhotra is seeking to 
locate his work centrally in Indian classical 
traditions. If, on the other hand, he wishes the 
reader to see his work as a novel and fresh 
interpretation of the tradition, it is necessary 
to clarify his differences with earlier 
formulations and to make the case for the 
advantages of his construction. As noted earlier, 
the specific sources, traditional and otherwise, 
that inform his position deserve better 
identification in the main body of this work.  
Those who are familiar with my work know 
of my efforts to counter interpretations of 
Advaita that, for various reasons, overlook the 
centrality of the Veda as a pramāṇa in the 
methodology of classical Advaita and instead 
propose experience (anubhava) as the 
conclusive source of our liberating knowledge 
of brahman.2 Valid knowledge (pramā) according 
to the Advaita Vedānta tradition is knowledge 
that conforms to the nature of the object which 
one seeks to know (vastutantram). Valid 
knowledge can be generated only by the 
application of a valid and appropriate means of 
knowledge, referred to as a pramāṇa. For 
Śaṅkara, the Veda and more specifically the 
Upaniṣad, is the single and unique source of 
liberating knowledge about the nature of 
brahman. It satisfies the criteria of being a 
source of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) by the fact 
of its unique subject matter (anadhigata), its 
non-opposition to other valid sources of 
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knowledge (abhādita) and the usefulness of its 
revelations (phalavath artha bodhaka). It is also 
clear that Śaṅkara and his disciples regard the 
Veda as a revelation from brahman, conveyed to 
the ṛṣis as word-constituted mantras. 3  This 
wisdom, in the Advaita understanding, is then 
conveyed from teacher to qualified student in a 
sampradāya or line of transmission. 
Overlooking the methodology and 
significance of the Veda as a pramāṇa, Malhotra 
adopts a science model to characterize the 
process and gain of wisdom in the dharma 
traditions.  “The dharma family (Hinduism, 
Buddhism, Sikhism and Jainism),” writes 
Malhotra, “have developed an extensive range 
of inner sciences and experimental 
technologies called ‘adhyātmavidya’ to access 
divinity and higher states of consciousness. 
Adhyātmavidya is a body of wisdom and 
techniques culled from centuries of first-
person empirical inquiry into the nature of 
consciousness undertaken by advanced 
practitioners (p.6).” Disregarding the classical 
arguments for the Veda pramāṇa, Malhotra 
speaks of the autonomous discovery of this 
teaching by anyone (p.56) and of the aspirant’s 
freedom to start afresh (p.56). He writes of the 
acquisition of knowledge through direct 
experience and empirical testing (p.61). 
Without engaging or responding to the 
Upaniṣad teaching that the atmā, as non-
objectifiable, ultimate subject, cannot be 
known through sense perception (indriya 
pratyakṣa) or through any process of internal 
cognition (sākṣi pratyakṣa), Malhotra speaks of 
the inner sciences developed through 
observation and experimentation. Any 
methodology of knowing proposed, however, 
must be related logically to the nature of the 
object that one seeks to know (pramāṇa prameya 
sambandha). The unavailability of the ātmā for 
any kind of objectification is particularly 
important in this context. To observe the ātmā 
as an object would require another illumining 
awareness and awareness cannot be bifurcated 
into subject and object. As Yājñavalkya puts it 
in Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (3.4.1), “You cannot 
see that which is the witness of vision; you 
cannot hear that which is the hearer of 
hearing; you cannot think that which is thinker 
of thought; you cannot know that which is the 
knower of knowledge.”4 The scientific analogy 
is deepened with Malhotra’s claim that the 
Indian traditions make no claims of finality of 
knowledge (p.42). The Advaita tradition is 
certainly cognizant of the limits of language 
and all symbol systems in conveying knowledge 
of brahman, but it claims also to offer a 
liberating teaching that is not tentative or 
uncertain. It will be helpful to have further 
clarification from Malhotra on this issue. The 
epistemological model that one advocates must 
be appropriately related to the subject of one’s 
inquiry. 
From the perspective of the classical 
Advaita tradition, as systematized and 
expounded by Śaṅkara, the employment of a 
science analogy to describe the method of 
acquiring knowledge of the ātmā is problematic.  
It implies that the revelations of the Vedas are 
available through methods similar to those 
employed in the empirical sciences. This would 
undermine the claim of the Veda to be a 
pramāṇa with a unique subject matter. It would 
mean that brahman is no longer outside the 
scope of perception and inference (external 
and internal) and the Veda pramāṇa becomes 
redundant. This comment is not meant to 
suggest that the effort by Malhotra, or any 
other contemporary interpreter, to offer 
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alternative epistemology on the model of 
scientific inquiry, is illegitimate. My concern is 
that such a model must not be presented or 
assumed as the traditional one, and that the 
case for it in relation to the classical Veda-
pramāṇa model needs to be explicitly argued 
and critically defended. The employment of the 
terminology of science to describe a mode of 
religious knowing does not immediately confer 
upon it uncritical legitimacy, and the limits of 
scientific models deserve critical scrutiny. 
What is interesting about the use of the 
scientific metaphor to speak of the process of 
gaining knowledge in the Indian traditions is 
that it developed under a specific constellation 
of historical factors and in response largely to 
the western impact on India. Malhotra’s 
discussion, whether he recognizes it or not, has 
continuities with this historical process. In the 
Limits of Scripture, I trace the circumstances in 
the Brahmo Samaj, in the late nineteenth 
century, when there was discomfort and 
embarrassment over the traditional authority 
of the Veda in debates with Christian 
missionaries.  This led to its formal rejection 
and replacement with intuition.5 The idea of 
personal experience as an immediate source of 
religious knowledge rose to prominence and 
became a leading idea of the period and a 
dominant motif of contemporary Hinduism. 
Personal experience was championed as 
sacrosanct and unquestionable.  Unitarian 
Christian thinkers like William Channing and 
Theodore Parker influenced also its 
formulation. Swami Vivekananda inherited the 
skepticism and mistrust of scriptural authority 
championed by Brahmo Samaj leaders and 
contributed to re-casting Hindu epistemology 
on the model of his understanding of scientific 
inquiry. In doing so, Vivekananda himself 
offers an alternative to the more traditional 
understanding of Vedānta epistemology based 
on the centrality of the Upaniṣad pramāṇa. He 
doe not offer, therefore, any detailed treatment 
of the Veda as a pramāṇa  in his writings.  The 
term is never employed directly by him, except 
on the one occasion of his commentary on the 
Yoga-sūtras of Patañjali. Aurobindo, the Indian 
thinker most profusely quoted by Malhotra, 
was deeply influenced by Vivekananda. He read 
Vivekananda extensively and reflects also the 
centrality of personal experience in his 
epistemology.  
Science as a method of attaining knowledge 
and as the key to human progress was enjoying 
considerable prestige among the Bengali 
intelligentsia in the nineteenth century. 6  
Vivekananda spoke of the scriptures as a 
collection of truths discovered through the 
experimentation of the various ṛṣis at different 
times. Each one of us, according to 
Vivekananda, must validate these teachings in 
our own experiences, by following the methods 
prescribed. Malhotra phrases this argument in 
similar terms, claiming that, “direct experience 
and empirical testing are important for the 
acquisition of knowledge. Truth is to be 
discovered and rediscovered for oneself, an 
endeavor that requires active inner and outer 
engagement (p.61).”  
Malhotra’s attempt to re-cast the Hindu 
tradition on the model of science, indebted as it 
is to earlier historical efforts, presents us with 
many similar problems. It does not engage 
sufficiently the radical differences between the 
objects of scientific inquiry and the ātmā that, 
as the ground of all cognitive processes and the 
ultimate subject, is not available for knowledge 
though any process of objectification, internal 
or external. While championing the supremacy 
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of personal experience, it overlooks the 
complexity of experience in religion and 
science. It assumes a self-validity and self-
interpretativeness that does not grapple with 
the complexity of the relationship between 
experience and interpretation. It assumes also a 
singular experience of samādhi across the 
Indian traditions, that requires ignoring the 
doctrinal diversity of the dharma traditions 
and, in particular, the dualism of Yoga where 
the nature of samādhi is best expounded. In 
reality, there is no single defining experience 
championed uniformly by all Indian traditions. 
It is problematic, to say the least, for any 
interpreter to bypass the different word-
descriptions of culminating experiences and to 
claim that these are alternative ways of 
speaking about the same experience. If 
Malhotra’s epistemological arguments are 
different and if these questions are inapplicable, 
then a substantial clarification from him will be 
helpful to this conversation.  I offer this 
perspective, not to superimpose simplisltically 
an earlier critique on Malhotra, but because of 
the historical continuities and overlapping 
arguments that I discern in Being Different. A 
critique is not discredited because it was 
advanced earlier. If the arguments made are 
essentially the same, then questions remain 
valid.  
One of the consequences of Malhotra’s 
disregarding the classical understanding of the 
Veda as śabda pramāṇa, and his use of a science 
model centering on the validity of personal 
experience, is an underplaying of the cognitive 
significance of the mantras of the Vedas and a 
clear emphasis on what he presents as their 
vibratory power. “Their deepest truth,” writes 
Malhotra, “ is vibratory in nature, and these 
vibrations can take us to levels of 
consciousness that transcend language (p.227).” 
Certainly, the Hindu traditions have 
emphasized the significance of right sound in 
the articulation and power of mantras. To 
overlook this is to miss something vital in the 
nature of a mantra. At the same time, Hindu 
theological traditions emphasize that the 
mantras fulfill their purpose also in 
communicating a teaching about the nature of 
reality. This follows from the right 
comprehension of the meaning of the mantras. 
To ignore this is also to miss something central 
to the nature of mantras, especially those that 
constitute the Upaniṣads.  The significance of 
meaning explains the development of 
sophisticated norms and tools of exegesis 
referred to as ṣaḍliṅga that were developed by 
Pūrva Mīmāṁsa exegetes and adopted by later 
Vedānta commentators. A sampradāya is a 
lineage of transmission, but also one of exegesis 
and pedagogy. Comprehension was important 
because the attainment of liberation itself was 
at stake. It is unfortunate that this dimension of 
the significance of Veda mantras, that explains 
so much of the intellectual vitality and energy 
of the classical tradition, receives minimal 
treatment in Malhotra’s discussion. My point, 
to make it absolutely clear, is not that sounds 
and vibrations are not unimportant. I contend, 
however, that these cannot be emphasized to 
the exclusion of meaning. The significance of 
the mantras is multi-dimensional and one 
hoped for some recognition of this fact in 
Malhotra’s work.    
I believe also that Malhotra’s one-sided 
emphasis on the vibrational character of 
Sanskrit leads to his argument for the 
fundamental non-translatability of the 
language. I share his concern about the dangers 
of forcing the artifacts of one culture into the 
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mould of another (p. 221), and his caution 
about the challenges, and even impossibility, in 
some cases, of easy translation. The issue of 
translation, however, though always 
challenging, presents different possibilities 
when the concern is with the communication 
of meaning.   Meticulous care and linguistic 
competence are necessary if unique categories 
are not to be lost, but this is different from the 
radical claim of non-translatability advanced 
by Malhotra in Being Different.  An alternative 
position is advanced by Swami Dayananda 
Saraswati, a distinguished contemporary 
teacher of Advaita, who argues that the Veda 
pramāṇa, and especially the teaching of the 
Upaniṣads, cannot be linked inseparably to a 
specific language and has no inextricable link 
with Sanskrit.  It can be available and 
transmitted in other languages. 7 This requires 
a skillful teacher, schooled deeply in the 
methodology of the tradition and rooted in its 
vision of reality, but liberating wisdom is not 
language-specific.8  To make an argument for 
the absolute non-translatability of Sanskrit is to 
imply also that the wisdom of the Hindu 
tradition is not accessible to someone without 
knowledge of the language.  
My final specific comment concerns 
Malhotra’s critique of  “tolerance” as a mode of 
relationship between religions.  In his 
problematizing of tolerance, Malhotra stands 
with earlier commentators like Elizabeth 
Spelman and Diana Eck who made similar 
observations.9 There is much to concur with in 
this critique, especially the assumptions of 
power and privilege inherent in the idea of 
tolerating another. Malhotra proposes 
replacing tolerance with “mutual respect.”  I 
found it difficult, however, to determine 
whether “mutual respect,” as described by 
Malhotra, referred to an ethics of interreligious 
relationships, or a theology of religious 
diversity.  What does it mean, for example, in 
the words of Malhotra, “that we consider the 
other to be equally legitimate (p.16)?”  Do we 
mean legitimate for him or her or are we 
speaking of legitimacy in a more universal 
sense? Does legitimacy imply that all religious 
claims have equal validity? Perhaps “mutual 
respect” is both ethical and theological, but the 
theology underlying “mutual respect” needs 
more critical unpacking. In describing an 
encounter (p. 21-22) in New Delhi with a 
delegation from Emory University, Malhotra 
clarified that respect means acknowledging 
other religions “to be legitimate and equally 
valid paths to God.” If we have in this 
statement the gist of Malhotra’s theology of 
religious diversity, is there not something 
amiss with his labors in this work to establish 
religious difference and to argue for the 
rational superiority of the traditions of India? 
Or am I missing something? The theology of 
religious diversity implicit in Being Different 
certainly needs more clarification and its 
similarities and differences from earlier models 
highlighted and argued. 
My reflection on Malhotra’s representation 
of the Hindu traditions is not meant to 
delegitimize the lens through which he reads. I 
do want, however, to particularize and 
contextualize historically this reading as one 
that developed substantially in response to 
Christian missionary criticism in the 
nineteenth century and in response to the 
encounter with western science.  Earlier Hindu 
interpreters were concerned, like Malhotra 
today, to show that the tradition had a 
methodology distinct from Christianity that 
was Bible-centered, authoritarian and closed to 
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the findings of empirical inquiry. They wanted 
to demonstrate that Hindu traditions employed 
scientific-like methodologies and that their 
findings were consistent with the claims of 
science.  This led to a decisive rejection and 
reinterpretation of the traditional authority of 
the Veda and its nature as a revealed teaching.  
The pramāṇa method of approach that I discuss 
here is also a specific lens, but it is an 
indigenous one with deep roots in the history 
of the tradition. We cannot rush to characterize 
it as “scientific” without careful clarification of 
the methodology and field of inquiry for 
science. It is a rational approach, deeply 
concerned not to contradict or be contradicted 
by the findings of other valid sources and is 
willing to open itself to the interrogation of 
these sources. It is very important that in any 
effort to distinguish ourselves from the other 
and to affirm our difference, we do not negate 
our identity. 
I applaud Malhotra’s passion to resist 
homogenization of the Hindu tradition and to 
affirm difference from other traditions.  How 
and where we identify and describe these 
differences must be the focus of fruitful and 
respectful intra-Hindu and interreligious 
conversation. Intellectually honest and 
vigorous intra-religious conversation is as 
important as interreligious ones and, in many 
cases, even more challenging. There is a long 
history of vigorous theological debate among 
the traditions of India exemplifying care in the 
public articulation of the opponent’s viewpoint 
and without the distraction of treating dissent 
as disloyalty to a community, nation-state or 
tradition. May this heritage inspire our own 
dialogical engagement.  
 
Notes 
	  	  1 Although the expression “dharma-traditions” 
is used in circles of discussion, the meaning and 
value of the formulation deserves critical 
discussion. It is not clear what is meant beyond 
identifying a tradition originating from the 
Indian sub-continent.  There may be value in its 
use, but this is yet to be clarified.  
2 See Anantanand Rambachan, Accomplishing the 
Accomplished: The Vedas as a Source of Valid 
Knowledge in Śaṅkara (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1991).  Also, Anantanand 
Rambachan, The Limits of Scripture: 
Vivekananda’s Reinterpretation of the Vedas 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994). 
3 Śaṅkara’s understanding of the origin of the 
Veda is discussed in his commentary on the 
second sūtra of the Brahmasūtra. 
4  The issue of how knowledge of the knower is 
gained is a vital one for the Vedānta tradition. 
For my discussion of this dilemma and 
resolution see, Anantanand Rambachan, The 
Advaita Worldview: God, World and Humanity 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2006). See Chapter 4.  
5  See Anantanand Rambachan, The Limits of 
Scripture, Chapter 1. 
6  See David Kopf, The Brahmo Samaj and the 
Shaping of the Modern Indian Mind (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1979), Chapter 2.  
7  Swami Dayananda Saraswati, Dialogues with 
Swami Dayananda,  (Rishikesh: Sri 
Gangadhareswar Trust, 1988).  
8 For the purpose of disclosure, let me state that 
I regard myself as a disciple of Swami 
Dayananda Saraswati. I studied Advaita 
Vedānta intensively with him for three years in 
India and my understanding and discussion of 
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the tradition is deeply informed by his 
pramāṇa-based approach to teaching.  
9 See Elizabeth Spelman, Inessential Woman: 
Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1988), 182. Also Diana Eck, 
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